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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Data on the social security system in Russia might suggest that the per-
formance of the pension system has been improving steadily over the
past two years. Indeed, the surplus of the Pension fund has increased
from about zero in 1999 to 0.9% of GDP in 2000 and may reach 1.3% of
GDP in 2001. At the same time, the average pension grew by more than
20% in real terms over the past year. The average pension now equals
90% of the minimal subsistence level and is expected to exceed it al-
ready this year. Yet, more thorough analysis demonstrates that the im-
provement was merely due to increasing wages on the back of strong
economic growth. The ratio of the average pension to the average wage
in the economy has remained stable over the past 2 years at about 32 –
 34%, which is a maximum for Russia, given its worker/retiree ratio and
the existing contribution rate. Meanwhile, the burden the pension system
levies on younger generations is excessively high:  at present, workers
are required to pay as much as 28% of their wages to the Pension fund.
With an aging population (the average life expectancy now is only 66
years compared with 69.2 years in 1990, but it has been growing steadily
since 1996) and a declining birth rate, the system may run out of funds
very soon. The worker/retiree ratio will begin to fall in 2010 as those
born right after WWII retire, and the ratio will sink further to about 1 by
the year 2050.
The only alternative to a PAYG pension system, where workers pay pen-
sions to retirees, is a funded system where younger generations accu-
mulate assets to finance their retirement living. A funded system obviates
a number of shortcomings of the PAYG system, namely demographic
and political risks, and better suits the concept of a market economy,
where people ensure their own well-being in old-age. Yet, a funded sys-
tem requires a sound financial system that will secure individual savings
and guarantee some minimal return.
The choice of the trajectory of transition from the PAYG system to a
funded pension system is the central problem for pension system re-
form. One need remember that during the transition working generations
have not only to accumulate funds for their own pensions but also to fi-
nance pensions for existing retirees (unless authorities decide to default
on the implicit debt to retirees). Thus, the burden of double taxation is
unavoidable. The speed of transition to a funded system may vary sig-
nificantly. The state may prefer to pay off all the implicit debts to retirees
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at once at the cost of higher taxes for working people or it may protract
the process for many years. The natural constraints that arise during the
transition are related to the minimal pension size and to the maximum
pension tax rate. The two must, at a minimum, guarantee social stability
during the period of reform.
In our paper we use a classic overlapping generation model to study the
issue of optimal transition from the PAYG pension system to a funded
one. The goal of the paper is to estimate the feasibility of such a trans-
formation, to establish the rules for choosing an optimal transition policy,
and to work out practical recommendations as to how this transition pol-
icy could be best implemented. The transition policy in the model is con-
ceived as a sequence of rates of contribution to the pension system and
replacement rates.
At the numerical simulations stage, three scenarios of transition to a
funded pension system are compared using a large-scale dynamic
model of the Russian economy. All the scenarios assume that the econ-
omy moves from a steady state with the PAYG pension system to a
steady state with funded pensions, though the speed of transition differs
among the scenarios.
The scenario that yields the highest welfare gains assumes that the rate
of contribution to the pension system (effectively the tax rate paid to the
pension system net of tax evasion) is increased by one-fourth at the be-
ginning of the transition in order to initiate the accumulation of social
capital. This rate is kept at 25% for the first 24 years, then it gradually
declines to 5%, by 5 percentage points every three years. Individual util-
ity in the new steady state with a funded pension system is 5.8% higher
than that in a steady state with the PAYG pension system. However, the
welfare gain from the reform is only 0.8%, as some generations suffer
higher taxation during the transition and the depth of reform is limited.
The highest burden the optimal transition scenario imposes on individu-
als is about 0.4% of their life-time utility. The model predicts long-run
macroeconomic gains, including an 8.6% increase in the stock of capital
in the economy, by replacing the PAYG system with a funded system that
possesses own capital stock. The total output per worker increases by
5.1% under a funded pension scenario.
The other two scenarios assume that the transition goes faster or slower
and imply lower social utility gains for the given parameters of the model.
In the model we assume that the individual discount rate is as high as
11% in order to reflect individual myopia. However, if the discount rate
declines below the 8.7% threshold, faster transition becomes preferable.
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Our analysis suggests that the transition to a funded pension system
produces a social welfare gain. However, a Pareto-improving transition is
not achievable in the model since some age groups must increase their
contribution to the pension system to initiate the accumulation of social
capital.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The market transformation in the former Soviet Union (and other post-
communist countries) had a negative impact on the system of social se-
curity and insurance. Although this system suffered specifically from
planned economy inefficiencies, the original system provided a certain
level of social guarantees to a wide range of the population. The social
support system developed the habit of receiving social protection, free
or with significant subsidization. The state has had to eliminate many so-
cial benefits it had earlier provided to individuals. Market reforms re-
sulted in partial or complete privatization of some activities traditionally
embraced by the public sector, for instance, health care, education, in-
surance, and, to some extent, the provision of retirement benefits. A
growing differentiation of income has made most of the privatized serv-
ices unfeasible to low- and even middle-income groups of population.
This implies that social services urgently need reforming. The project fo-
cuses on the reform of the pension system, aimed at increasing effi-
ciency and mitigating the redistribution conflicts.
The need to reform the pension system in Russia also stems from the vi-
cious nature of the current pay-as-you-go (PAYG) redistributive scheme.
In order for such a system to work satisfactorily, it requires a constantly
low ratio of retirees to working people and sustainable growth of real
wages. Only then can the implied return of the pension system be suffi-
ciently high. In Russia both of these conditions tend to be violated. Real
wages have been decreasing constantly over the 1991–1998 period. The
demographic structure has not improved either. Due to a high number of
different privileges (earlier retirement, for instance) and the aging popu-
lation, the ratio of retired people to working people will decrease further.
Currently, the number of working people per one retiree is close to 1.7,
which is, for instance, two times lower than in France.
However, the demographic structure will improve slightly in the upcoming
decade when generations born during World War II will reach retirement
age. Moreover, a relatively numerous cohort of people born in the eight-
ies will enter the work force by that time. These changes will allow for
the transformation of the PAYG pension system into a funded one by im-
posing no significant burden on the working people. All these circum-
stances justify the need for fundamental reform of social security and
social insurance, which must be started in the near future.
The purpose of this project is to analyze the transition from a PAYG pen-
sion system to a funded one, to estimate the feasibility of such a trans-
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formation and to work out practical recommendations for how this transi-
tion policy could be implemented.
The strategy of our analysis is to study the major relations between
model variables on a simplified theoretical model in order to find the ba-
sic principles underlying the optimal transition policy and to test various
scenarios of transition on a computer model taking into account under-
lying dependencies between model variables.
There exists a vast amount of literature on the topic under consideration,
represented by the pioneer work of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond
(1965). In their work, the heterogeneity implied by the age structure of
the population does not allow one to derive a simple expression for ag-
gregate consumption and savings. Only the standard two-period model
avoids the aggregation problem due to the extreme restriction of the
demographic structure.
Blanchard (1985) made substantial progress toward developing a tracta-
ble, overlapping generation model with a reasonable demographic
structure by assuming that individuals face a constant probability of
death each period. Yaari (1965) employed a similar restriction, making
the individual horizon finite. Weil (1987) proposed a similar framework
where individuals live forever, but a new cohort is born every period.
However, both Blanchard's and Weil's frameworks do not capture life-
circle behavior. All living individuals are identical and have identical pro-
pensities to consume.
Our analysis needs to capture the life-cycle property to study the impact
of the redistribution of income, both over time and between younger and
older generations. The original model can also be easily transformed into
a model where agents live longer than two periods.
For the numerical simulations, we use a large-scale dynamic model
similar to that used by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The model is used
to compare the welfare impact of three transition scenarios. The demo-
graphic structure of the model is calibrated in accordance with the
demographic data of Goskomstat to approximate the structure and dy-
namics of the population of the Russian Federation. Similarly, the size of
contribution to the pension system and replacement rate are chosen so
as to closely reflect the size of the contribution to the pension system
and the replacement rate existing in the Russian economy.
The analysis suggests that pension system reform allows social welfare
gains though at the sacrifice of certain age cohorts. The relative size
of those gains is rather small as we limited the depth the reform.
The model, however, does not take into consideration a number of posi-
tive externalities the funded pension system may produce (e.g.
Holzmann, 1997).
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The next section is devoted to the theoretical analysis of the two-period
model. The third section describes the calibration of the model for the
numerical simulations. The results of the comparison of three transition
scenarios are discussed in the last section.
2. THE MODEL
The model proposed for the analysis is a conventional, overlapping gen-
eration, general equilibrium model proposed by Diamond (1965). The
model allows us to trace the impact of the changes in pension policy on
individuals' consumption/savings decision and on the aggregate savings
in the economy. However, our choices of model specification are limited
in the case of the deterministic form of the model with perfect foresight.
In particular, the non-stochastic form of the model allows us to divide the
lifetime of every generation into only two periods: work and retirement.
Since an individual's current consumption/savings choice depends on his
expectations about the future, the determinacy of equilibrium requires a
unique relation between model variables for consecutive moments in
time. When the number of life periods exceeds two, the competitive
equilibrium in the model is undetermined unless we change the perfect
foresight assumption. The initial specification of the model imposes very
strong restrictions on the demographic structure. On the one hand, this
enables us to have a closed-form solution for aggregate consumption
and savings. On the other hand, the model allows only a rough approxi-
mation of reality.
The attempt to increase the number of periods within an individual's life
requires additional assumptions (other than perfect foresight) about an
individual's expectations of the model variables in the future. The natural
solution here is to reformulate an individual's optimization problem in
terms of expected utility. The source of uncertainty is stochastic shocks
in the production function. The inclusion of risks here is regarded as a
way to cope with the indeterminacy of equilibrium. Separate analysis of
risk aspects of the pension system must involve a financial markets
submodel as well as a wider model of government. The government (or
Treasury) is often treated as an issuer of safe debt while market returns
are stochastic. This raises the question of an optimal portfolio of the
pension system trust fund and an optimal pension scheme (defined-
benefit or defined-contribution).
However, the decision rule for the optimal choice of consump-
tion/savings is non-linear in general and does not have a closed-form
solution. There are two approaches to the problem: drastic simplification
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of the model or numerical simulations (e.g. Bohn, 1998). Both ap-
proaches restrict our ability to carry out a theoretical analysis of risks.
To try to change the perfect foresight hypothesis, we assume that the
total output in the economy is subject to multiplicative shocks in the form
of a stochastic multiplicative factor in the production function:
),(),(~ LKFuLKF = , (1)
where u is a non-negative random variable with some distribution func-
tion. If we additionally assume a Cobb–Douglas form, both the equilib-
rium interest rate r and wage rate w will have the same stochastic
nature.
Agents in the model maximize their expected discounted utility. Stochas-
tic dynamic programming reduces the multi-period problem to a se-
quence of simple, two-period problems. The corresponding Bellman
equation characterizes the optimal intertemporal choice of consumption
and has the following form:
)()( 11 ++ ′=′ tttt cUREcU β , (2)
where β refers to an individual's discount factor; Rt+1 is the gross inter-
est rate between time t and time t + 1.
However, the explicit solution to that problem could be derived with very
strong restrictions, either on the form of the utility function or on the sto-
chastic nature of labor income and the interest rate. In particular, there
are two main cases when an explicit solution could be obtained. The first
one is the case of diversifiable labor income risk. The second is the case
of quadratic utility. However, the assumption of a deterministic wage
does not match the specification of the production sector in our model.
The second assumption is also imprudent. The linear quadratic problem
exhibits the certainty equivalence property and gives the solution for
consumption as a constant share of an individual's discounted lifetime
income. Since an individual's discounted lifetime income is the sum of
random future wages discounted at random future interest rates, even
the strongest assumptions about the nature of stochastic processes un-
derlying wt and Rt do not allow us to derive current consumption as a
tractable function of the current level of capital or output. We, therefore,
need to simplify the model to the case where agents live for two periods.
Thus, we assume that each person in the model lives for two periods.
People work in the first period when they are young, retire in the second
period when they are old, and then die leaving no bequests. There are
two generations (young and old) alive at the same time. In every new
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period, a new generation of young people is born. The number Lt of
newborns at time t is (1 + n) times greater than the number of older
people Lt-1 born at time t – 1 (n is constant over time and refers to the
rate of population growth).
Agents in the model work only one period, supplying inelastically one unit
of labor. In the first period of their life, t, they receive real wage wt and
pay contribution τt. to the pension system. Individuals derive utility from
consumption both when they are young and old. An individual born
at time t consumes 1tc  in the first period of his life and 
2
1+tc  in the sec-
ond period when he is retired. To finance their consumption in the period
of retirement, young people save st in the first period. In the second pe-
riod they receive capital income ttRs  and benefits from the pension
system bt+1.
Individuals maximize their lifetime utility Vt, treating wage rate, interest
rate and pension policy parameters τt and bt+1 as given:
max)()( 2 1
1 →+= +ttt cUcUV β (3a)
subject to budget constraints
tttt swc −−= τ
1 , (3b)
11
2
1 +++ += tttt bRsc . (3c)
The production sector of the economy is given by the Cobb–Douglas
production function
a
t
a
tttt LKALKFY
−
==
1),( . (4)
Labor here is supplied inelastically and is proportional to Lt, the size of
the young generation at time t. The supply of capital Kt in period t, is
determined by the saving decisions of the young generation made in pe-
riod t – 1 and by the capital stock of the pension system if it possesses
some.
s
tttt KLsK += −− 11 . (5)
The Cobb-Douglas form of the production function lets us rewrite the
production function in per-capita terms
a
tt kAy = , (6)
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where kt is the effective capital/labor ratio.
The output in the economy is divided between consumption and invest-
ment:
a
t
a
ttttttt LKAYcLcLK
−
−+ ==++
12
1
1
1 . (7)
In order to rewrite the resource constraint above in per-capita terms, we
divide both sides of the equation by Lt:
a
ttttt kAycn
ckn ==
+
+++ +
21
1 1
1
)1( . (8)
We assume full depreciation here. One may equivalently think that de-
preciated capital is subsumed in the production function.
The pension system also has an intertemporal budget constraint. We as-
sume that at time t the system possesses the stock of social capital stK
(or pension system trust fund). Contribution to the pension system, τt,
which the pension system collects from the young generation, is added
to the stock of social capital. Similarly, pension benefits to retired indi-
viduals bt are subtracted from the social capital stock. The social capital
together with private savings forms the stock of capital in the economy
that is supplied to the production function. The social capital, therefore,
earns interest at the market rate. The intertemporal budget constraint of
the pension system is given by
s
tttttt
s
t KRbLLK +−= −+ 11 τ . (9)
Similarly, in per-capita terms it has the following form:
s
tttt
s
t kRbn
kn +
+
−=+ + 1
1
)1( 1 τ . (10)
The model above allows negative private savings if the social capital is
higher than zero. In this case individuals may borrow against a future
pension. Due to the homogeneity of agents in the model, aggregate pri-
vate savings would be negative as well, and the whole capital stock in
the economy would be supplied by the pension system. This, however, is
unrealistic and we restrict private savings to be non-negative. In the case
of the PAYG system the stock of social capital is zero. The equilibrium in
such a model requires private savings to be non-negative to ensure that
the economy has non-negative capital. Hence, we assume st ≥ 0.
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2.1. Competitive Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the model will be a sequence of ∞ttt cc },{
21 , such that:
E1. Given the government's pension policy ∞ttt b },{τ  and the sequence
of competitive interest rates and wages, the trajectory },{ 2 1
1
+tt cc  solves
the individual's optimization problem (3) for all t. The individual optimiza-
tion problem implies the following first-order condition:
)()( 2 11
1
++ ′=′ ttt cURcU β . (11)
E2. Factor prices are competitive:
1)( −=′= attt kAakfR , (12)
a
ttttt kAaRkkfw )1()( −=−= (13)
for all t.
E3. The pension system budget constraint (10) is satisfied for all t.
E4. The aggregate feasibility constraint (8) is satisfied for all t.
Note that the aggregate feasibility constraint (8) implies equilibrium on
the capital market, which requires private savings equal to total capital
less social capital:
),,,())(1( 111 +++ =−+ ttttt
s
tt bRwskkn τ . (14)
Equation (14), together with the pension system budget balance (10),
gives the law of motion of the total capital and the social capital in the
competitive equilibrium.
The competitive equilibrium in the model, in fact, allows an arbitrary pen-
sion policy. We assume that the economy is initially in a steady state with
the PAYG pension system. In the PAYG steady state, the pension tax rate
τ PAYG is defined by the desired replacement rate bPAYG and the rate of
population growth n:
PAYGPAYG
1
1
b
n+
=τ . (15)
2.2. Command Optimum
The command optimum in the economy defines how a central planner
would allocate resources to provide for all future generations. The cen-
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tral planner maximizes the discounted sum of life-time utilities of all fu-
ture generations
[ ]∑∞ +− →+
t
tt
t cUcU max)()( 2 1
11 βγ , (16)
subject to the economy's resource constraint (8)
a
ttttt Akycn
ckn ==
+
+++ +
21
1 1
1
)1( .
The central planner's first-order conditions are
)()()1( 12 tt cUcUn ′=′+ γβ ,             t = t0, ¾, ∝, (17)
)()()()1( 1 1
1
+′′=′+ ttt cUkfcUn γ ,       t = t0, ¾, ∝. (18)
Equation (17) is a condition for the optimal allocation between the gen-
erations alive at the same time. Equation (18) is a condition for the opti-
mal intertemporal allocation.
2.3. Optimal Pension Policy
The central planner's first-order conditions (17) – (18) respect the indi-
vidual's first-order condition under competitive equilibrium (11). In other
words, both individual and central planner allocate resources over time
efficiently. The source of inefficiency in the competitive economy is the
allocation of resources between generations alive at the same time.
Therefore, the task of a pension policy is to allocate consumption effi-
ciently between the young and the old while the market itself will provide
the intertemporal efficiency. Since the choice of individual consumption
is determined from the individual optimization problem (2) – (4) and de-
pends upon the set {wt, Rt+1, τt, bt+1}, the task of the government is
to choose {τt, bt+1} so as to satisfy the central planner's first-order con-
dition
)),,,(()),,,(()1( 11
1
11
2
++−− ′=′+ tttttttttt bRwcUbRwcUn τγτβ (19)
given the laws of motion of the total capital and the private capital in the
economy and the factor markets equilibrium conditions. Note that the
choice of optimal pension policy becomes the choice of the present
value of the pension package ttt Rb τ−++ 11 / . As long as the government
keeps the present value of the pension package unchanged, the individ-
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ual's budget constraint and savings/consumption decisions also remain
unchanged. The only parameter that varies together with the size of pen-
sion contribution and benefits is the composition of savings (private vs.
social). In this case, the share of social savings in total savings goes up
as τt increases. This can be seen by substituting the pension system bal-
ance (10) into the equation for capital balance (14). Therefore, the con-
dition for optimal pension policy is








τ−′γ=








τ−′+β
+
+
+−− t
t
t
tttt
t
t
ttt R
b
RwcU
R
b
RwcUn
1
1
1
1
11
2 ,,,,)1( .  (20)
Note that condition (20) as well as the two command optimum, first-
order conditions do not define the optimal policy explicitly. Rather both
sets of equations define the optimal dynamics of the control variable and
additional assumptions should be made to obtain a solution in an explicit
form.
To get an explicit solution for the optimal choice of pension policy pa-
rameters, we need to make assumptions about individual preferences.
Since the condition for the optimal pension policy is a part of the central
planner's first-order conditions, the explicit solution for the pension pol-
icy parameters could be obtained only if the central planner's optimiza-
tion problem has an explicit solution. To insure that the problem has a
closed-form solution, we assume logarithmic individual's preferences.
2.4. Logarithmic Utility Function
The solution to the central planner's optimization problem can be found
using the dynamic programming method. The solutions we obtain for the
optimal consumption of young and old individuals are as follows:
a
tt kA
a
c βγ
γγ
+
−
=
)1(1 , (21)
a
tt kA
na
c βγ
γβ
+
+−
=
)1)(1(2 . (22)
To solve explicitly for 1/ −− ttt Rb τ  we need to substitute the individual's
optimal choice of c1 and c2 into the central planner's first-order condi-
tions (21) – (22). The solution of the individual maximization problem has
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the following form:




+−
+
=
+
+
1
1ind1
1
1
t
t
ttt R
b
wc τβ , (23)




+−
+
=
+
++
+
1
11ind2
1 1 t
t
tt
t
t R
b
w
R
c τβ
β
. (24)
Now we can derive the condition for the optimal pension policy:
a
t
t
t
tt kA
a
R
b
w βγ
γγ
τβ +
−
=



+−
+ +
+ )1(
1
1
1
1 . (25)
Substituting for kt+1 and Rt+1 as a function of kt from the aggregate fea-
sibility constraint, we get the present value of the pension package:
t
t
ta
t R
b
kAa
a
τβγ
γβγ
−=


−−
+
−+
+
+
1
1)1(
)1)(1(
. (26)
If we now assume that τt is not a lump-sum but proportional to the indi-
vidual's wage at time t (i.e., ttt wπτ = ) and pension benefits are a con-
stant share of the wage rate at time t + 1 ( 11 ++ = tt wb ϕ , i.e., the lagged
replacement rate is constant over time) then the condition for the opti-
mal pension tax rate πt is
1
)1)((
)1)(1(
1
+
−+
−+
−
+
=
a
a
nt βγ
γβγγφπ . (27)
Therefore, the optimal pension tax rate is constant over time. If pension
policy during transition in our model aims to keep pension benefits pro-
portional to the average wage rate in the economy, the optimal strategy
would be to fix the size of contributions to the pension system at some
optimal level and to let the economy accumulate capital freely.
To see how the optimal rate of contribution for the pension system de-
pends on the parameters of the model, we will check the sign of the de-
rivatives of πt with respect to the rate of population growth, n; individual
and social discount factors, β and γ; production function parameter a;
and replacement rate, φ. We assume that β, γ and a are positive and do
not exceed unity. Replacement is also assumed to be positive while the
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rate of population growth may have either sign, although it can not be
smaller than –1.
1. 0
)1( 2
<
+
−=
nnd
d γφπ .
This result suggests that higher population growth requires lower contri-
butions to the pension system to sustain the same level of pension
benefits for older generation. This is due to the fact that a higher rate of
growth increases the ratio of the number of contributors to the number
of beneficiaries within the pension system and eases the burden on
every young agent of financing pensions for the older generation.
2. 0
1
>
+
=
nd
d γ
φ
π
.
The relation between the replacement rate and the rate of pension con-
tribution is simple: higher pension benefits require higher financing from
young people.
3. 0
)1()(
)1)(1(
2
>
−+
−−
=
a
a
d
d
βγ
γγγ
β
π
.
With the increase of the individual discount factor, agents in the models
apply higher weight to the consumption level in the future. Then along
the optimal path, the consumption of older people increases as β goes
up. The rate of contribution to the pension system also rises, reflecting
the higher optimal consumption of the retirees.
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To find the sign of the second term of the sum, we assume that individ-
ual discount factor β is smaller than social discount factor γ and capital
share in output a is between 0.5 and 1. In this case
.
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The numerator ββ −a23 is non-negative if holds a3/1≥β . For the low-
est possible a = 0.5, individual discount factor β must exceed 2/3 to
guarantee a positive sign of γπ dd / . The intuition behind the result is
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that a higher social discount factor implies higher capital stock in the
steady state or faster capital accumulation along the transition path since
higher weights are applied to the utilities of future generations. Then
heavier taxation on younger people is required to maintain the optimal
capital stock.
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As the share of capital in the output, a, goes to unity (the production
function becomes closer to linear), the optimal rate of contribution de-
creases. This is basically due to the reallocation of the output between
production factors. Particularly, as parameter a grows, the share of labor
in the total output goes down. Consumption of the young generation as a
share of total output then also diminishes but faster than the condition
for optimal allocation prescribes. Then the rate of contribution to the
pension system must be decreased to compensate for a consumption
decline.
2.5. Comparative Statics
2.5.1. Optimal pension system. The steady state of an economy that
grows along the optimal path is characterized by the interest rate close
to the sum of the rate of population growth and the social discount rate
γγ /)1( − . The precise expression for the steady state interest rate is
γ
n
R
+
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Then the steady state level of capital in the economy with an optimal
pension system is
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This capital intensity kopt satisfies the Modified Golden Rule. As the social
discount factor approaches unity, the steady state capital intensity kopt
becomes equal to the Golden Rule (GR) capital intensity kGR, where
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The GR capital level maximizes per-capita consumption. In this case the
utilities of all future generations are treated with the same weight. The
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GR capital intensity is higher than the capital intensity in the economy
with an optimal pension system while the interest rate is lower in the GR.
The steady state present value of the pension package as a share of
wage rate is given by equation
)1)((
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)1(1PV
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−+
−
++−= βγ
γβγ . (31)
Therefore, the present value of the pension package in the steady state
is positive and becomes zero as the social discount factor approaches
one and the economy comes to the Golden Rule steady state. Since so-
cial savings and private savings are perfect substitutes, we may have any
composition of capital stock in the MGR steady state. For instance, if the
pension tax rate is set so as to leave an individual's after-tax income
equal to his consumption in the first period ( )1/( ββτ += , which implies
zero private savings), then the whole stock of capital in the economy
must be owned by the pension system. The share of the pension sys-
tem's capital stock in the total capital in the GR steady state is given by
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The share of pension system capital in the total capital in the Modified
Golden Rule is
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The share of social capital in the total capital stock increases as the de-
sired pension tax rate τ grows.
For various parameters of the production sector and individual prefer-
ence, the share s(τ) could be treated as an estimate for the economy's
ability to evolve along the optimal steady state equilibrium path without
external (the central planner's) intervention. Thus, for the same rate of
pension tax, economies with technology closer to linear technology re-
quire a higher share of social capital. This also can be seen from equa-
tion (34), which shows the competitive equilibrium interest rate in the
steady state when there is no social security system in the economy
(pure competitive equilibrium).
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The interest rate in the equation above is higher than the rate of popula-
tion growth and, therefore, the level of steady state capital is lower than
the Golden Rule steady state capital level.
Equation (34) demonstrates that the higher the share of capital in the
total output a, the higher the interest rate in the competitive equilibrium
and, therefore, the lower the stock of capital in the competitive equilib-
rium. Then, if we want to put the economy into the optimal steady state,
a higher state intervention is required. As far as the individual discount
factor is concerned, as the discount factor β decreases the economy
may evolve along the optimal steady state path with a lower share of so-
cial capital. This is due to the fact that a lower discount factor implies
lower optimal consumption for retirees and, therefore, less intervention is
required to provide for the older generation.
2.5.2. The PAYG pension system. The steady state of the competitive
equilibrium with the PAYG pension system is characterized by zero social
capital, which implies
n+
=
1
β
τ . (35)
The value of the steady state capital level can be found from equa-
tion (36):
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where kPAYG refers to the steady state capital level under the PAYG pen-
sion system. The right side of the equation (which describes the total
savings in the economy) is a decreasing function of τ. Taking kPAYG as an
implicit function of τ, we discover that the sign of τddk /PAYG is negative
as well. The increase in the PAYG pension tax rate decreases private
savings (in a higher proportion if RPAYG is higher than 1 + n) and reduces
the steady state capital level.
The present value of the pension package in the competitive economy as
a share of labor income is given by
PAYG
PAYG
PAYG
1
PV
r
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−
= τ . (37)
Since the steady state interest rate of an economy with a PAYG pension
system is higher than the rate of growth of the population, the present
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value of the pension package is negative. An increase in the pension
tax,τ, reduces the value of the pension system package further. The
negative impact of the PAYG pension system on an individual's welfare
stems from the fact that the implied return on the individual's contribu-
tion to the PAYG pension system is equal to the rate of growth of the
population, n, while private savings yield market interest rate, rt, which is
higher than n. The expression above, in fact, estimates the implied tax
that every individual has to pay in order to finance the higher consump-
tion of the first generation that enjoyed pension benefits while paying no
contribution to the pension system.
2.6. Dynamics
In order to compare how economies with different pension systems ac-
cumulate capital, it is worth deriving the expression for aggregate sav-
ings in terms of its share in the total output. The optimal pension system
forces the economy to save share aγ  of the total output. The evolution
of capital then is given by
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An economy with no pension system saves only )1)(1/()1( β++− na  of
the total output. Therefore, the capital stock in the competitive equilib-
rium with no pension system evolves according to
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For the same initial capital level kt, an economy with the optimal pension
system saves )1/()1( aa −+ βγ  times more than a pure competitive econ-
omy with no social security. Since the PAYG pension system decreases
savings, the rate of capital growth in the PAYG pension system will be
even lower.
The two-period model, due to an extreme simplification of the demo-
graphic structure, allows us to achieve the first-best allocation with only
one control variable. This is because the only variables that must be
regulated are the consumption levels of the old and young generations
alive at same time while intertemporal efficiency is provided by market.
However, in models with the number of periods more than two, the opti-
mal pension policy should care about the consumption of many genera-
tions with only two control variables. The goal of the social planner in the
case of a multi-period model remains the same: to maximize the dis-
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counted life-time utilities of all current and future generations. The first-
order conditions (15), (16) are easily expanded to the case of many pe-
riods. The first-best allocation is characterized by the set of )1(2 −N
equations. The first N – 1 equations (40) describe optimal intertemporal
allocation.
[ ] )()(1)()1( ,1,1 jttjt cUkfcUn ′′+=′+ −− λ ,        j = 2, ¾, N, (40)
ct–1, j–1 here stands for consumption of a generation of age j – 1 at
time t – 1.
The conditions for optimal intergenerational allocation are
)()( 1,,1 ++ ′β=′γ jtjjtj cUmcUm ,         j = 1, ¾, N ­ 1, (41)
mj here stands for the share of the cohort of age j in the total size of
the population. Combining both sets of equations (40) and (41) and as-
suming that the structure of the population is constant over time, we
obtain
)()1()( 1,11, +++ ′+β=′ jttjt cUrcU ,            j = 1, ¾, N ­ 1. (42)
Condition (42) coincides with the individual's first-order condition for the
optimal allocation of consumption over time. Therefore, the market again
allocates resources over time efficiently. The task of a pension system is
to provide efficient intergenerational allocation in accordance with condi-
tion (41). Generally, the first-best allocation in the model with many-
period lives is achievable only with age-dependent pension taxes on la-
bor income.
3. CALIBRATION
3.1. General Strategy
For the simulation part, we assume that initially the economy is in the
steady state with the PAYG pension system. The government announces
its transition policy that consists of paths of pension tax rates and re-
placement rates. Then the economy starts to evolve along a new trajec-
tory to the new steady state with a funded pension system. The new
steady state is characterized by non-zero stock of social capital and a
new contribution and replacement rate.
The model still possesses the perfect foresight property. The problem of
indeterminacy in the case in which the number of periods in the model
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exceeds two occurs due to the inability of agents to form their expecta-
tions about future market returns.
The stock of capital kt at time t depends on individuals' savings decision
at time t, which, in turn, depends on individuals' expectations about the
return on capital in the future periods t + 1, ..., t + N – 1. Similarly, the
saving decisions of agents alive in future periods depend on their ex-
pectations about capital levels far distant in time. Thus, under the perfect
foresight assumption, the cycle of expectations evolves endlessly. The
natural approach to this problem is to assume that after some distant
period, agents expect that the economy converges to a steady state.
The task of the numerical simulation then is to choose the sustainable
capital trajectory that lets the agents in the model form their expectation
about future capital stock such that the resulting savings/consumption
choice and capital stock match the trajectory. The capital stock in the
new steady state depends on pension policy parameters and can be
found either analytically or fitted through the substitution of particular
pension policy parameters into a computer model. This lets us determine
the expectations of agents in the model and solve the indeterminacy
problem. Note that period T, after which we assume the economy comes
to the steady state, may be and must be significantly more distant in
time than period N, the time by which the government finishes imple-
menting the transition policy. The important issue here is the sensitivity
of the truncated model to the length of time after which we assume the
economy reaches the steady state.
The time-frame of reforms is not strictly given as well and depends on
the sustainability of the transition trajectory.
3.2. Demography
For the numerical simulation part, we use the model with agents who are
alive for 15 periods, corresponding to adult ages 20 through 66 — the
average life expectancy in Russia. Here we combine 3 years of actual life
into one period. In the first 11 periods of their life, individuals receive la-
bor income while in the other 4 periods they are retired. The initial
weights of cohorts of different ages are adjusted to the demographic
structure of the population in Russia in accordance with Goskomstat
data. After calibration, the demographic structure in the model implies
1.7/1 workers/retirees ratio. It is close to the 1.6/1 ratio estimated using
Goskomstat data. Every new period a new cohort is born. The new
cohort is 1 + n(t) times larger than the preceding cohort. Although the
rate of population growth in Russia, n, is currently negative and close to
–0.003 (the total number of population decreases), we assume that it will
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grow over time up to 0.03, reflecting the approximate 1% annual popula-
tion growth.
3.3. Individual Preferences
Each agent of cohort j at the beginning of his life chooses the perfect-
foresight consumption path given the sequence of pension policy pa-
rameters so as to maximize his life-time utility:
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We assume that an individual's discount factor also varies with the indi-
vidual's age. This assumption is very close to the geometric discounting
concept. Laboratory and field studies demonstrate that discount rates
are much greater in the short-run than in the long-run. To capture this
effect, we assume that an individual's discount factor βi increases with an
individual's age, i.e., an individual's discount rate ii ββ /)1( − declines with
his age. The classic papers on geometric or hyperbolic discounting as-
sume the following form of the individual utility function (e.g., Liabson,
1996):
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Hyperbolic discounting, however, implies time inconsistency of an indi-
vidual's consumption choice. Dynamic inconsistency requires the mod-
eling of an intrapersonal game where the players are temporally situated
"selves." To avoid extra complexities, we assume that preferences are
time-consistent, though the individual's discount rate increases with his
age. Hence, the consumer at time 1 (self 1) expects that the discount
rate between two moments in the future will be higher than the discount
rate between the current period and future period. This conflicts with the
hyperbolic discounting concept as the latter assumes that the discount
rate between two moments in the future is lower than that between today
and tomorrow. Moreover, empirical studies suggest that older people
demonstrate a higher propensity to save out of disposable income. How-
ever, older people prefer a prudent savings strategy. In Russia, for in-
stance, retired people are reluctant to purchase CDs or other types of
assets. The largest part of savings by older people is mattress savings
that yield no return and do not add to the stock of capital in the econ-
omy. Moreover, the average propensity to save is likely to be close to
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zero for older people, as their disposable incomes are too low to allow
savings at all.
We assume that the initial discount factor β1 equals 0.9 and decreases to
0.78 by the model age 15. We believe this allows better reflection of an
individual's myopia though the preferences still remain time-consistent.
Here we assume an isoelastic utility function with a relative risk aversion
coefficient also varying over an individual's life:
)(1
,, )(1
1 j
jtjt Cj
U σ
σ
−
−
= . (45)
The choice of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σj is a separate
task. There is no unique opinion about the size of σj. In particular, Altig,
Auerbach et al. (1997) in their simulation assumed σ equal to 4. Gorin-
chas, Parker (1999) estimated empirically the value of σ for the American
economy. In their paper different methods gave different estimations:
σ1 = 0.514 and σ2 = 1.3969. The demarcating value σ = 1 determines
which effect in the individual's consumption/savings behavior prevails:
the income or substitution effect. The case of σ > 1 implies that the in-
come effect dominates and individual savings decreases as the interest
rate grows. In our case σ > 1 can partially capture the positive effect of
capital accumulation. In particular, although a higher level of capital
stock in the economy lowers the return on capital, the corresponding de-
velopment of financial institutions and financial market infrastructure
makes investment more attractive. Moreover, the attitude toward risk
varies over age cohorts, as Gorinchas and Parker (1999) suggest. We
assume that initially σ is less that unity, which refers to a relatively high
elasticity of savings with respect to interest rate changes. Over age, σ
increases reflecting the more conservative saving behavior of older peo-
ple. Thus, we assume that initially σ equals 0.6 and then growths over
age to 1.2 for retirees.
3.4. Production
The production function in the model is given by the classic Cobb–Douglas
production function, aaLKAY −= 1 , with the capital's share in the total out-
put equal to 0.6 and the share of labor income equal to 0.4. The value of a
is chosen in accordance with the statistical data on the composition of out-
put in Russia. The factor A in the production function is a scale parameter,
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which can include technical progress. We neglect technological progress,
leaving A constant over time. The depreciation rate is set to 0.15.
3.5. Pension System
The rate of contribution to the pension system in the simulation part re-
fers to the effective pension tax rate net of tax evasion. Although for the
Russian economy, the duty to the Pension Fund is currently as high as
29% of individual's wage, we set the contribution in the pension rate
model equal to 20% to take tax evasion into account. This figure is also
in accordance with estimates based on the size of the Pension Fund's
revenues/expenditures and the average size of monthly pension pay-
ments and wages. The replacement rate is set to 32%, exactly as Go-
skomstat's recent statistics suggests. The initial values of the model pa-
rameters above determine the initial steady state of the model.
Although the final goal of the transition might be a Golden Rule
steady state, we are looking for alternative steady states, affordable and
reachable in a reasonable time period. Examination of the Golden Rule
steady state suggests that the share of social capital for any type of
preferences exceeds the 50% level, which is inconsistent with a market
economy.
The target rate for the pension tax is set to 5% in order to try to elimi-
nate all distortions from taxation in the economy. Although almost any
replacement rate is attainable with some corresponding stock of social
capital, to limit the state intervention in the economy, we fix the replace-
ment rate at 50%. In the resulting steady state, the share of social capi-
tal in the overall capital stock equals 14%.
4. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
4.1. Steady States
The initial steady state with the PAYG pension system is characterized by
the interest rate equal to 0.59, which corresponds to the annual return of
17%. Individuals' life-time consumption and income have the following
profile (see Fig. 1). The maximum individual's consumption level falls for
ages 45 – 55, which corresponds to ages 15 – 18 in the model.
Asset holdings are depicted in the Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1. Individual's income and consumption with the PAYG
pension system. 
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Fig. 2. Individuals' asset holdings with the PAYG pension
system. 
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4.2. Funded Pension System
The total stock of capital in the steady state with a funded pension sys-
tem is 8.9% higher than that in the steady state with the PAYG system.
The social capital in the steady state accounts for 13.7% of the total
capital stock. The interest rate is equal to 0.53 or 15% in annual terms.
The consumption profile in the steady state with a funded pension sys-
tem is similar to that in the steady state with the PAYG system. Individu-
als' consumption and income in the PAYG system are depicted in Fig. 3.
For comparison all the profiles are summarized in Fig. 4.
Although consumption over an individual's life under funded pensions is
on average 11.7% higher than that in the PAYG case, the discounted
life-time utility of individuals increases by only 5.8% after the transition to
the new steady state.
The steady state private savings in the economy with the PAYG pension
system are 6.3% higher than those under funded pensions. Asset hold-
ings in the two steady states are illustrated in Fig.  5.
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Fig. 3. Individuals' income and consumption with a funded
pension system.
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Note that the discounted life-time income in the equilibrium with funded
pensions is 24.6% higher than that of the PAYG steady state. However,
the analysis reveals that younger cohorts save almost equally under both
systems while older people save more under the PAYG system. This is
due to the substitution effect that offsets the increase in savings caused
by the higher life-time income of every individual. Moreover, older people
in the new steady state receive a substantially higher pension from the
funded pension system and do not need to save as much as they save
under the PAYG system.
4.3. Transition
An important constraint on transition policy is imposed by the character-
istic of individual preferences. The partial derivative of total savings with
respect to future capital levels is negative and declines in absolute value,
as the capital variable becomes more distant in the future. As a result
the attempt to accelerate capital accumulation with more intensive sav-
ings by a social security system is partially offset by a reduction in pri-
vate savings. Then for a given path of the pension tax and replacement
rates, the increase in expected future capital stocks will decrease an in-
dividual's savings and, therefore, lower the actual level of capital that will
arise in the economy. This property rules out "bad" transition trajectories
where, for instance, the economy starts to eat away all the capital stock,
and this matches the expectations of agents in the model.
We have studied three scenarios of transition. For all scenarios we as-
sume that the replacement rate starts to grow in the first period of tran-
sition and increases by 0.02 for every period up to 0.5. Therefore, the
replacement rate reaches its steady state value after 10 periods.
The first scenario assumes accelerated transition. During the first 5 peri-
ods, the rate of contribution equals 28% and then it consequently re-
duces to 25%, 10%, 7% and finally 5%. Thus, after 7 periods the contri-
bution rate and the replacement rate come to the steady state levels.
Under the moderate transition scenario, the contribution rate is kept at
25% over the first 8 periods. Then it gradually declines to 5% stepping
down by 5 percentage points every period. The slow transition scenario
assumes only a 3 percentage point initial increase in the contribution
rate. The contribution rate remains at the 23% level for 10 periods, then
it goes down by 2 percentage points every period. Profiles for transition
policy parameters are depicted in Fig. 6.
The "slow" scenario has the longest transition length. It lasts 20 model
periods that corresponds to 60 years. The length of the "accelerated"
scenario is twice as short as that of the "slow" one. The evolution of the
capital stock under all three scenarios is depicted in Fig. 7.
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The capital stock gains 90% of the difference between the two steady
state capital levels between the 9th – 15th periods of transition. As far as
individual welfare is concerned, the generations mostly exposed to the
transition burden are those near retirement. These generations have to
pay in full the increased transition tax but can not enjoy the increased
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Fig. 7. Capital accumulation under three different scenarios.
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Fig. 6. Three scenarios of transition from the PAYG pension system
to a funded pension system.
Rate of contribution and replacement rate, %
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pensions. The life-time utility of those generations under transition is de-
picted in Fig. 8.
As it can be seen from the diagram, retired people benefit from the re-
form since they enjoy a higher replacement rate. Therefore, utility rises
for generations of age 10 – 15. People who retire at the moment when
the contribution rate goes down after the initial increase have the lowest
utility levels. Most generations working at the moment when the transi-
tion starts (except for the two youngest ones) experience utility reduction
under the "accelerated" scenario. Taking into account the fact that the
number of people in the cohort decreases with the cohort's age, it
becomes apparent that as long as individuals do not care about future
generations, the accelerated transition policy is likely to gain support
of less than 50% of the population. "Moderate" and "slow" scenarios,
due to their longer period of higher taxation, are likely to gain even less
support.
The highest burden that the accelerated transition imposes on individuals
is about 2% of the individual's life-time utility, while for moderate and
slow transition, the figures remain as low as 0.4% and 0.2% respectively.
However, these estimates should not be treated as a reliable basis for
making a policy choice since they closely depend on individuals' prefer-
ences. Another good indicator of the burden of transition is the maximal
drop in the discounted life-time income. Our estimates suggest that the
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Fig. 8. The life-time utility of different age cohorts (negative
ages refer to the cohorts not born at the time when the transi-
tion begins).
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accelerated transition imposes a maximal burden of about 5% of an indi-
vidual's life-time income. Moderate and slow transitions cost at maxi-
mum 3% and 2% of one's life-time income.
4.4. Social Optimum
We assume that the social discount factor γ is 0.9. In this case, the
weighted sum of the life-time utilities of future generations reaches its
maximum under the "moderate" scenario. The accelerated transition is
less attractive for the central planner while slow transition is the worst
option. Although the "accelerated" scenario implies substantial sacrifices
for several generations that work during the period when reforms are ini-
tiated, the burden of the transition is offset by the faster growth of their
utility in the future. As the social discount factor decreases (social dis-
count rate increases) the "accelerated" scenario becomes less attrac-
tive. However, for a discount factor higher than 0.92, accelerated transi-
tion becomes preferable. Slow transition earns lower social utility for any
discount factor.
Although the transition to a funded pension system yields a 5.8% utility
gain when we compare individuals' utilities in the two steady states, so-
cial welfare increases by only 0.8% as a result of the transition. This is
partly due to the relatively modest depth of the reforms. Social capital in
the steady state accounts for less than 14% of total capital. For instance,
in Great Britain, pension funds hold about one half of all domestic cor-
porate equity. The same figure for the US is close to 25%. Thus, more
radical reforms resulting in a higher proportion of social capital allow the
economy to shift closer to the Golden Rule steady state. Welfare gains in
that case would be greater. This holds when we assume that social
capital is equally efficient as private capital. When social capital is less
efficient compared with private capital, the accumulation of capital by the
pension system may result in lower total output even if the overall capital
stock increases in absolute value.
Although transition to a funded pension system allows a social welfare
increase, Pareto-improving transition is not achievable in the model.
Some generations still have to bear the burden of double taxation and
the increased replacement rate is not able to compensate for it.
5. CONCLUSION
The transition scenario that yields the highest welfare gain suggests that
the rate of contribution to the pension system must be increased by one-
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fourth from 20% to 25% to let the pension system begin to accumulate
capital. In terms of individual utility, transition to funded pensions pro-
vides a notable gain of about 5.8% to the people fully covered by the
funded pension system compared to those under PAYG pensions. How-
ever, a social welfare gain of about 0.8% is rather modest. This is due to
the necessity of increased taxation during the transition period. The
highest burden the moderate transition scenario imposes on individuals
is about 0.4% of their life-time utility. Other transition scenarios imply
lower social utility gains.
The model predicts long-run macroeconomic gains, including an 8.6%
increase in the stock of capital in the economy, from replacing the PAYG
pension system with a funded pension system that possesses its own
capital stock. The total output per worker increases by 5.1% for those
under funded pension systems.
Although the model is carefully calibrated to capture the basic properties
of the Russian economy, it still suffers some shortcomings. First, the
model lacks a financial system submodel whose task is to transform
funds collected by the pension system into the economy's capital stock.
We assume that pension contributions are directly channeled into the
economy. However, should the pension system employ the financial
market infrastructure to allocate money, a great number of other factors
that affect market yields must be taken into consideration.
Secondly, the central planner in the model runs only the pension system
while other types of state intervention are neglected. These are federal
and local taxation, social insurance, etc. Each system runs its own
budget, though spillovers between these budgets are also possible, for
instance, financial aid from the Federal budget to the Pension Fund in
Russia.
Thirdly, the model assumes an inelastic labor supply and taxation of indi-
vidual incomes in favor of a pension system. However, in Russia's case,
the pension tax is levied on employers instead of employees; changes in
the pension policy parameters may affect both the labor supply and the
demand for labor.
To conclude, although no transition scenario guarantees Pareto-
improving transition, the pension system reform allows social welfare to
increase. But the majority of people alive at the moment when the re-
forms begin have to bear the burden of higher taxation during the transi-
tion. When the decision on the pension system reforms is to be deter-
mined by majority voting, reforms are unlikely to gain enough support.
Therefore, there is a difficult political dilemma about when to begin the
transition. The experience of developed countries demonstrates that re-
forms may be postponed endlessly.
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